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A conference organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland engendered 
an informative discussion of consumer protection in ﬁ  nancial products markets. 
Anticipating signiﬁ  cant changes in ﬁ  nancial regulation, the conference asked the 
question, “how could regulators successfully protect consumers?” It intentionally 
looked beyond the existing institutions. The ﬁ  rst of three panels discussed how 
consumers gather information and process it to make purchase decisions. Lessons 
learned from research on food labeling and shopping were discussed. Another panel 
examined the roles of professionals who guide consumers through a marketplace. 
Panelists discussed the legal obligations of brokers and rating agencies. The 
ﬁ  nal panel focused on product preapproval processes like the FDA’s regulation 
of pharmaceuticals and the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s post-market 
tracking of injuries. This Policy Discussion Paper summarizes the presenters’ 
material and draws out themes that point a way forward for efﬁ  cient, competitive 
ﬁ  nancial product markets that are safe for consumers.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Introduction 
In past fi  nancial crises, American consumers suff  ered loss of deposits and investments, and loss of 
employment in the ensuing economic slowdown. In the run-up to the current recession, consum-
ers did not leave fi  nancial speculation to the experts; they participated directly to an extent unprec-
edented in U.S. history. A confl  uence of global and national forces sent waves of inexpensive credit 
toward American households, allowing consumers to buy homes at prices four and fi  ve times their 
annual income. Th   ey took second mortgages backed by the value their homes appeared to have 
appreciated to. Th   ey used home equity loans to pay off   credit cards, then ran those cards up to the 
limit again. Like all fi  nancial excesses, it ended badly. Since mid-2007, the receding tide has left 
behind piles of foreclosures, bankruptcies, damaged personal credit ratings, and fear among lend-
ers and borrowers. 
Observing the carnage, the Obama administration proposed reforming regulation, with a 
new organization, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, at its center (Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency Act of 2009). Th  e  Offi   ce of Policy Analysis at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland decided to contribute to the debate surrounding the proposal by holding a conference, 
“Consumer Protection in Financial Product Markets,” on September 11, 2009. Th  e  animating 
questions included: What should a consumer protection agency do? How does one go about 
protecting consumers? What works and what does not work?
At a major turning point, like the one where fi  nancial consumer protection currently stands, 
it is appropriate to take a broader view of regulatory strategy. Th   e organizers of the conference 
set out to look at consumer protection in other markets, such as food and household products. 
A survey of the fi  eld revealed that a major part of consumer protection activity happens in the 
judicial system, including class action suits, Attorney Generals’ prosecutions, and Federal Trade 
Commission activity. Th   erefore, the agenda was designed to include experts in nonfi  nancial con-
sumer protection and legal consumer protection, along with people who have worked in fi  nancial 
consumer protection. 
Th   e conference brought out several concepts from other consumer protection fi  elds that show 
great potential for adaptation to the fi  nancial arena. Th   ere are also measures that seem best suited 
for resolution in the courts. Together with improvement of existing practices, a reworked con-
sumer protection regime should be able to shield American consumers from another wave of 
underpriced credit.
Th   is discussion begins with Susan Wachter’s overview of the current crisis (section 2), followed 
by Janis Pappalardo’s description of the prevailing economic theory of consumer protection and 
the potential for improving its implementation (section 3). In section 4, I share the insights of-
fered during the fi  rst panel that encourage new, more nuanced thinking about disclosure and 
how consumers use information to make fi  nancial decisions. Section 5 discusses fi  nance profes-
sionals who could guide consumers through the complex marketplace. In section 6, I discuss the POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 29, MAY 2010
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applicable ideas from Dan Carpenter’s description of product pre-approval processes and David 
Pittle’s explanation of post-market monitoring. Section 7 relates material regarding the institu-
tions of regulation, primarily as presented by Pat McCoy. Section 8 gives a brief account of the 
deliberations surrounding the presentations, including the concluding discussion led by Mark 
Sniderman. Th   e paper’s conclusion (section 9) discusses recommendations that can be supported 
with the evidence presented at the conference.
Overview of the Recent Crisis
Among people who hold any of the numerous diff  ering opinions about the fi  nancial crisis of 
2008–09 would argue that there was any single cause. Susan Wachter explicated the various forces 
that converged to create what she characterized as “the pro-cyclical production of risk.” Everyone 
involved in fi  nancial markets is expected to observe the price of credit and buy or sell quantities 
in response. Th   e prices should refl  ect the risk of each type of transaction. If the prices are wrong, 
there is no reason to expect the markets to clear the correct quantities. Starting at the consumer 
level, Wachter explained that investing in homes appeared to be riskless before the crisis. Con-
sumers perceived that home prices only increased, and there were few counterexamples in recent 
memory. Coastal regions in particular had seen strong home price appreciation for at least a decade 
(Shiller 2007). Constant appreciation meant the homeowner could always sell the home if they ex-
perienced a negative income shock. Th   e only risk was on the up side. Speaking of buyers, Watcher 
said that “we particularly want the most house now because as behavioral economists also tell us, a 
major driver. . . is regret aversion. We don’t want to seem stupid. We don’t want to miss out.” Col-
lecting the appreciation on a home appeared to provide earnings without labor and wealth with-
out saving. Some consumers feared the day when prices would rise so high they would be “priced 
out of the market forever.”
Th   e brokers and nonbank lenders who sold mortgages and home equity loans to these con-
sumers perceived, perhaps correctly, that they faced no risk. In their business model, they held 
few or none of the notes. Th   ey collected the fees, profi  ted, and immediately sold the loans into 
the secondary market. Purchasers on the secondary market also perceived minimal risk because 
they bought the mortgages in the form of investment grade (highly rated) mortgage-backed secu-
rities. (MBS). Secondary market purchasers did not face any legal risk, even if the mortgages were 
fraudulently originated, because current laws held only the originator liable. Th   e ratings fi  rms 
likewise protected themselves from suits that might claim they misled investors: Th  eir  purchase 
agreements added the caveat that the expected losses suggested by their ratings were valid “under 
current conditions” only. For a number of years, they were valid, and then clearly, the residential 
real estate market conditions changed.
Investors’ eagerness to get the relatively high returns off  ered by MBS with the perceived safety 
of investment-grade ratings brought capital into the real estate market. With home prices rising 
much faster than household incomes, lenders had to innovate to meet the demand for these se-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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curities. Th   ey either had to lower underwriting standards to make loans to people who would 
not have qualifi  ed under traditional standards, or they had to develop new loan products that 
at least temporarily lowered payments to a level the borrowers’ incomes could cover. Th  ey  did 
both. Subprime mortgage originations expanded from 10-15 percent of the market in the 
1990s to 50 percent in 2006 (Pavlov and Wachter 2006). Among the subprime and Alt-A 
loans, nontraditional products such as interest-only loans and negative amortization loans grew 
from almost nothing to over 50 percent of originations (McCoy, Pavlov, and Wachter 2009).
Some investors, realizing they could not analyze the performance of mortgage portfolios in 
real time, acknowledged that they did not know the risk of their MBS holdings. So they pur-
chased credit default swaps (CDSs), a form of insurance against falling asset values. Th  is  further 
lowered their perception of the risk they faced. Th   e sellers of the CDSs, having observed the 
response to the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, acted as if they were too big to fail. 
In the event of major losses, they expected regulatory agencies to arrange a rescue eff  ort that 
would prevent a complete loss. Having transferred their risk to the broader fi  nancial industry or 
the taxpayer, the CDS sellers felt they did not need to set aside large reserves against losses. Th  is 
lowered the price at which they could sell the insurance, again underpricing the risk.
As the high returns and the illusion of minimal risk attracted more funds into real estate 
markets, the cycle reinforced itself. Easy credit raised home prices, reinforcing the consumers’ 
belief that homes could be a source of wealth and income, if they got in soon enough. As there 
were many processes at work, there were also many points at which the cycle could reverse.1 
Clearly, the cycle did reverse, causing enormous losses for consumers, lenders, investors, and 
taxpayers.
Th   e Prevailing Consumer Protection Regime: An Economist’s Perspective
Having surveyed this situation, a regulator must ask what consumer protections were in place—
and did they function? Janis Pappalardo is an economist at the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), an agency whose primary mission is consumer protection. She examined consumer pro-
tection from an economist’s perspective. Th   is begins with the concept of the competitive market. 
Consumers are assumed to be fully informed and able to compare products. With these provi-
sions, producers will bring products to the market and sell them at cost (competitive markets 
create zero profi  ts). According to Pappalardo, this forces us to think of competition as inherently 
pro-consumer. Th   e consumer will be protected from dishonest producers because their inferior 
product or infl  ated price will be discovered in the market, and consumers will switch to a com-
petitor. Much of the FTC’s work is directed at promoting competition. Th   is often takes the form 
of enforcing antitrust statutes.
Th   e economists’ models allow for relaxing the assumptions and acknowledging that viola-
tions of the assumptions will change the prices and quantities in the market. For example, the 
search costs that consumers must pay to gather information about products may not be zero, 
1.  A candidate for the tipping 
point is that the 2006 vintage 
of subprime mortgages ﬁ  nally 
overreached. These mortgages 
went very bad, very quickly, 
with 20 percent of borrowers 
defaulting within a year of 
origination (Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert 2008). Without new 
buyers constantly coming into 
the market, prices stag-
nated and then began falling. 
Borrowers who had put little 
down or borrowed all their eq-
uity were under water. Banks 
would not reﬁ  nance loans on 
the depreciated homes. The 
ensuing foreclosures ﬂ  ooded 
the market and pulled prices 
down further.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 29, MAY 2010
4
as a purely competitive market requires. Some products cannot be evaluated at all until they are 
consumed. In that case, the producer has information the consumers cannot have, creating a situ-
ation called “information asymmetry.”
One of the FTC’s primary functions is reducing information asymmetries by ensuring that the 
information producers pass to consumers in the marketplace is factual. Pappalardo broke FTC 
tasks down into the areas of “inform,” “educate,” and “regulate.” Informing involves the regulator 
selecting certain facts and requiring that producers convey those facts to consumers. Education in 
this context, refers to teaching the public how to process those facts in making their decision, as 
through public service announcements or literature. In regulating, the strongest action, the FTC 
acts directly on the producer.
Producers who state outright falsehoods may be prosecuted for fraud if their misrepresenta-
tions of products’ qualities are deemed to cause harm; in that case, the FTC can take legal action 
against producers. However, most off  enses are prosecuted under the legal concept of “unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices,” which can be proven more easily than fraud.
Pappalardo reiterated a principle widely accepted among economists: that variety—and innova-
tions that create it—are good for consumers because there is large variance in consumers’ prefer-
ences and resources. Consumers generally have more information about their individual prefer-
ences and resources than a regulator does. Th   erefore, it is diffi   cult or impossible for a regulator to 
defi  nitively label a consumer’s choice to be wrong. 
Th  e concepts of variety and information can be seen in the current consumer protection 
regime, which revolves around disclosure. Providers can create products with unlimited combi-
nations of contract terms, as long as they disclose those terms to consumers before a contract is 
signed. Consumers generally sign documents to indicate they have received the disclosure and 
agree to the terms. Th   e FTC can prosecute lenders if disclosures contain false statements or omit 
important details. 
Very few of the complaints that consumers bring to the FTC can be prosecuted as fraud 
because the lenders completed the required disclosures properly, and consumer signed off   on 
them. Th   e disclosed contract terms are often unfavorable to consumers, but consumers sign them 
nonetheless and lose their down payment or home. How is this possible? Pappalardo pointed 
to increasing doubts regarding the effi   cacy of disclosures (Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafi  r 2008; 
Renuart and Th   ompson 2008). Disclosures failed to stop millions of recent homebuyers from 
entering into contracts that, in hindsight, were very bad for them fi  nancially. Instead of protect-
ing consumers, the disclosures end up protecting lenders from accusations of unfair or deceptive 
practices. 
Th   ere has been little empirical research on disclosure forms, and Pappalardo’s own experimen-
tal testing suggests that those currently in use do not work well (Lacko and Pappalardo 2004).
Pappalardo, and her colleague, James Lacko, convened a random sample of 800 mortgage hold-
ers. Th   ese people did not contact any agency to lodge a complaint. At the beginning of the inter-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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views, a majority of the borrowers indicated that they were satisfi  ed with their mortgages. FTC 
staff   examined their loan documents and asked the borrowers basic questions that are answered 
by the documents. Th   e borrowers’ replies indicated very low understanding of the terms of their 
loans. Th   is lack of understanding existed despite the consumers receiving and signing all the re-
quired disclosure statements. In some cases, Pappalardo concluded, “the disclosures were actually 
worse than ineff  ective. Th   ey actually seemed to create consumer misunderstandings.” 
Building on this research, Pappalardo and Lacko designed an experiment. Th   ey selected widely 
used disclosure documents for home mortgages and designed some simpler, clearer forms to 
convey the same information. Th   ey asked the borrowers to examine each document, and then 
tested their comprehension. Respondents given the simpler forms were able to correctly answer 
80 percent of the test questions on average, Th   is was a 19 point improvement over the group 
given forms currently in use. Th   e experiment demonstrates that rethinking the disclosure forms, 
developing a standard through rigorous experimentation, and requiring use of those forms could 
improve consumers’ understanding of the contracts they are entering into and could enable them 
to select contracts more favorable to themselves.
Information and Consumer Decisionmaking
During the fi  rst panel of the day, three speakers presented reasons why the disclosure-based con-
sumer protection regime might be insuffi   cient to protect fi  nancial product consumers. Greg El-
liehausen began with an overview of behavioral economics, a subfi  eld of economics that empha-
sizes the limits of the rationality that shapes people’s economic decisions. He cited studies on risk 
perception bias, that is, people’s inaccurate estimates of the probabilities that must be used to calcu-
late the expected value of a purchase or investment (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). Th  ere 
are numerous other cognitive biases: Shui and Ausubel (2005) found that people underestimate 
how painful it will be to repay consumer loans. Elliehausen argued that current disclosures are not 
very eff  ective because they are responses to problems perceived by policy makers, whether research 
verifi  es the problems’ existence or not. Th   e disclosures are created based on vague, even confl  icting, 
mandates and are not designed to help consumers overcome their cognitive biases.
Th   e second presenter, Alan Levy, shared his insights based on 20 years of experience in the 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Consumer Studies Team. His research has focused on 
how consumers relate to claims and nutritional labels. He uncovered considerable evidence that 
in the real world, search costs are far from zero. Consumers treat their time as very valuable and 
seek to minimize the time they spend gathering information about products. Th   ey read nutrition 
labels only if they have a specifi  c question in mind (Szykman, Bloom, and Levy 1997). Consum-
ers generally trust that claims made in advertisements or on the front of packages are truthful. 
For example, a consumer may intend to purchase low-fat yogurt based on their tastes or a doc-
tor’s recommendation. Th  ey  fi  nd the yogurt section of the supermarket’s dairy department and 
purchase any yogurt claiming to be low-fat. If the containers are not labeled with claims of “low POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 29, MAY 2010
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fat” upfront, the consumer might look at the nutrition label. If the package claims low-fat, the 
consumer believes the product satisfi  es his standard, and he does not take the time to confi  rm it 
by looking at the label (Roe, Levy, and Derby 1999).
Levy refers to this as the “truncation eff  ect.” It can be harmful if consumers end up with 
products that are not the best for them. On the other hand, consumers actually welcome claims 
that save them time and eff  ort in shopping. Th   is is why the FDA focuses on making sure product 
claims are accurate. Th   e parallels to this are the claims fi  rms make to sell fi  nancial products. In 
the case of mortgages, home equity loans, and credit card agreements, even fewer people read 
the disclosures that are the equivalent of the nutritional label. Consumers rely heavily on the 
claims made by advertisements, loan offi   cers, and brokers. Part of the problem consumers face in 
fi  nancial product markets arises from the prevalence and long history of consumer protection in 
other markets. Consumers assume all food on a store shelf is free of parasites and toxic chemicals 
because government agencies monitor the processing and punish violators. Consumers also as-
sume that fi  nancial product providers are legally obligated to provide “safe” products. Th  is  means 
they are apt to accept claims without verifying them by reading detailed disclosures. Levy said, 
“Most consumers know how supermarkets work as intermediaries between food manufacturers, 
suppliers, and consumers. But few consumers seem to know how mortgage brokers work… few 
consumers know much, if anything, about fi  nancial regulations.”
Levy concluded by highlighting several diff  erences between people’s consumption of food and 
their consumption of fi  nancial products. People shop for food frequently and repeatedly and can 
try an unfamiliar product at little expense. If it is unsatisfactory, they purchase a diff  erent product 
the next week. Over a lifetime, grocery shoppers become very familiar with their own preferences. 
In contrast, most people buy fi  nancial products very rarely, even just a few times in their life. 
Consequences are major in terms of wealth lost or gained, and consumers do not have a strong 
sense of what they should judge the products on. 
Th   e description of the challenges consumers face in fi  nancial product markets dovetails with 
the John Lynch’s description of situations where “nudging” can be helpful. For the benefi  t of the 
conference attendees, he defi  ned nudging and explained how it could be applied to consumer 
protection in fi  nancial product markets. “A nudge is trying to help consumers make better de-
cisions by changing the choice context subtly or changing defaults that make the most likely 
mistakes less likely,” he explained. Nudging is most useful, Lynch argues, when decisions, “are 
hard … infrequent, [and] there is no feedback that would help people learn from experience.” 
He gave the example of organ donation. When surveyed, large majorities of most populations say 
that making one’s organs available for transplant in the case of an accidental death is benefi  cial 
to society. However, in countries with opt-in organ donation programs, between 4 percent and 
25 percent of people opt in. In countries where the default is participation and citizens must opt 
out of donating their organs, participation is usually over 95 percent. Choice exists in both cases, 
but the choice context radically changes the outcome (Johnson and Goldstein 2004).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Another example is retirement accounts. Policymakers and most employees agree that it is 
good to save for retirement through 401K withholdings. However, if employees must visit their 
human resources department, fi  ll out the paperwork, and start receiving a smaller paycheck than 
they are accustomed to, many put off   the task indefi  nitely. Most large employers now make 
participation in retirement programs the default, which employees must intentionally opt out of 
(Madrian and Shea 2001; Choi et al. 2002). Th   is results in substantial increases in participation.
In the case of fi  nancial products, Lynch argues, a regulator who aims to protect consumers 
should nudge them toward products that have a low probability of causing fi  nancial hardship. To 
accomplish this, the nudge has to happen earlier in the decisionmaking process than the point 
when consumers currently encounter disclosures. Lynch and his co-authors have built research 
on John Hauser’s (1978) theory of probabilistic choice models. Th   eir empirical evidence suggests 
that 78 percent of the variance in consumers’ purchases is explained by their consideration set 
(Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991). Only 22 percent of the variance can be explained by any 
information the consumer processes regarding the products he or she considers. “For an option to 
be chosen it has to be considered,” Lynch said, “you know it sounds obvious, but it’s profound.” 
Secondly, he explains, “in order for an option to be chosen, the consumer has to fail to consider 
something they like better.” Even comprehensive disclosures have no eff  ect unless better products 
make it into the consumer’s consideration set. 
To address this, Lynch suggests we need something that acts like a supermarket for fi  nancial 
products, bringing similar, competing, products together in one place, where the consumer can 
easily examine them and choose one. Financial products do not need physical shelf space, but 
a database could facilitate market operations. Th   e regulator could require all providers to peri-
odically fi  le the products they have on the market. Agency staff   would then assess the products 
for consumers’ safety in certain economic circumstances. Consumers would work with “recom-
mender” software to search the database, using input regarding their fi  nancial situation and pref-
erences. Th   ey could express a preference for a bank they already have accounts with or a lender 
with an extensive record of lending in their neighborhood. Th   is would allow providers to dis-
tinguish themselves through customer service and a good reputation and to avoid degenerative 
competition based on price alone. Th   e system would provide a list of fi  ve products deemed safe 
by the regulators. Th   is accomplishes what Lynch advocates: making sure consumers consider safe 
products. Th  e vast majority would probably select one of the recommended items, Choice is 
preserved by allowing people to select a product not on the list if they sign a disclosure indicating 
its possible dangers.
A stronger, related recommendation is the proposal to require that consumers be off  ered a 
plain vanilla product. Consumers could opt out. Lynch made the point that this standardiza-
tion would ease comparison shopping. Complex products require complex disclosures and com-
parisons on multiple dimensions, which does not make shopping easier. In the discussion that 
followed the fi  rst panel, Creola Johnson (moderator of the second panel) mentioned another POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 29, MAY 2010
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variation of the system suggested by Susan Wachter (2003). Consumers would enter their infor-
mation and desired loan characteristics into an online system. Lenders would review the requests 
and off  er products. Th   is would result in direct competition between the providers and lighten the 
consumer’s information gathering burden. Lynch suggested that disclosure of loan terms could 
be made to a regulatory agency or nongovernmental organization, which in turn would guide 
consumers through the market. David Pittle, a member of the product regulation panel, high-
lighted the intermediary’s incentives, noting that the guide needs to be a disinterested party, not 
a salesperson who benefi  ts from selling the highest cost product.
Th   e Role of Gatekeepers
Financial professionals were the central focus of the day’s second panel. Tom Fitzpatrick spoke 
directly to the question of aligning incentives. As Susan Wachter had explained, loan originators 
during the expansion of the housing bubble did not bear the risk of the loans they originated. Th  e 
loans were immediately sold into the secondary market. Beyond that, Fitzpatrick explained, some 
brokers and thinly capitalized mortgage companies did not operate under any standards at all. In 
many states, mortgage originators did not have to be licensed. Th   ey were not bound by a legal duty 
to match consumers with “suitable” products, as investment advisors are. Th   ey had no fi  duciary 
responsibility to their clients, as corporate offi   cers have to their shareholders. Without violating 
any law, originators could sell mortgages that were completely inappropriate for borrowers’ needs. 
When brokers committed outright fraud (for example, by collecting fees and then not ), they 
could simply declare bankruptcy if anyone brought a suit against them. Since brokers’ operations 
required no capital, not even an offi   ce lease, some brokers had literally nothing to lose. 
In cases where borrowers are defrauded, an archaic law is at work against the consumer. As 
Fitzpatrick explained, an eighteenth-century ruling by Lord Mansfi  eld established in the com-
mon law that an assignee who purchased a promissory note (a mortgage) could not be held liable 
for actions of the person or fi  rm that originated the loan. Th  e originator’s wrongdoing could 
not even be used as a defense against payment. Th   is ruling was originally intended to encourage 
people to use banks’ promissory notes as currency. In the intervening centuries, legislatures have 
nullifi  ed the ruling in all consumer markets except home mortgages. Reversing this situation is 
known as imposing “assignee liability” on the market.
If assignee liability is in place, the investors in the secondary market will face signifi  cant losses 
if they purchase loans originated through fraud. Borrowers could use the fraudulent act in court 
to defend against payment. Fitzpatrick noted a study by Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009) 
fi  nding that loans sold into securitization do not perform as well as those held on portfolio. 
Th   ere are several possible explanations for this, including the possibility that originators hold the 
loans that they believe are more likely to be repaid. Th   e absence of assignee liability discourages 
secondary purchasers from investigating the details of the loan because if they become aware of 
fraud before they purchase the loan, they can be held liable for it. Th   e current practice is to avoid 
detailed investigation and to purchase a pool of loans after the originator has skimmed the best FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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for its own portfolio. Th   is practice allowed underwriting standards to deteriorate with no timely 
response in the secondary market, harming both borrowers and investors.
In the second panel, Jerry Fons spoke about a type of gatekeeper, albeit one removed from 
the consumer. His experience and expertise relates to the fi  rms known as Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Ratings Organizations (NSROs). Most prominent among these are Moody’s, Standard 
and Poor’s, and Fitch. Th   e organizations arose to help reduce the information asymmetry between 
companies and investors in the era of industrialization and railroads. Th  ey were supported by 
subscribers to their publications of ratings until the 1970s, when the business model shifted so 
that debt issuers paid agencies to rate them. Critics maintain that this creates a confl  ict of inter-
est. Fons explained that the process has become interactive: A fi  nancial fi  rm contacts the ratings 
organization regarding an asset-backed security. Th   e raters specify the mix of loans necessary to 
achieve an investment-grade rating, and the fi  rm attempts to assemble a portfolio of such loans. 
Th   e potential for consumer protection exists if the rating agency gives lower ratings to securities 
that are backed by fraudulently made loans or loan the consumers will not be able to repay. Lower 
ratings would close the gate to secondary investors and starve consumer-gouging fi  rms.
Fons explained that ratings agencies never attempted to perform this function, but assumed 
that loan originators were screening borrowers for their ability to repay. “I think the models were 
not designed for the decline in underwriting standards that we had,” he explained. In hindsight, 
it is clear that underwriting standards were falling, which is why securities received investment-
grade ratings and then failed to perform to the level the rating suggested (Dell’Arricia, Igan, and 
Laeven 2008; Mian and Sufi   2007). Fons argued that government agencies and regulators should 
not rely on ratings in their work. Regulators concerned about consumer protection must be aware 
that ratings organizations have not attempted to protect consumers or motivate safe product of-
ferings by lenders. If rating organizations take on these functions in the future, it will be a major 
change to the system.
Consumer Protection through Product Regulation
In the third panel, Dan Carpenter spoke from his expertise in the function and experience of the 
FDA’s drug approval process. Th   e FDA conducts product pre-approval, a market-wide gatekeeping 
function. Carpenter makes the bold claim that drug approval is “…not so much an intervention 
into an existing market. Th   ere is no modern pharmaceutical market without the standards and the 
information that the FDA created.” Th   e agency set a standard for rigorous scientifi  c testing of all 
medications. Pharmaceutical fi  rms are motivated to conduct the testing or risk having their medi-
cation rejected. In the course of the testing, the fi  rms gain tremendous amounts of useful informa-
tion, which often leads to new innovations. 
Carpenter pointed out that, contrary to a simple understanding of markets, in which any 
regulation imposes costs and decreases quantity, product pre-approval can expand a market. By 
removing “lemons” and increasing consumer confi  dence, regulation can increase demand. He 
cites work by Marc Law (2003), which shows that when state governments fi  rst imposed food POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 29, MAY 2010
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processing standards, those regulations caused increases in consumption of processed food. Like-
wise, Carpenter’s own research explores the development of the psycho-pharmacology fi  eld. In 
the 1970s, the FDA reviewed all the research on psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and decided to 
take some medications that had long been in use off   the market. Firms responded with major in-
vestments in research, which led to the wider array of more eff  ective medications available today 
(Carpenter 2005). If the regulator had not pulled the ineff  ective “lemons” from the market, they 
might have continued to dominate the market indefi  nitely. 
Th   e lessons that can be learned from the FDA pre-approval process would require adaptation. 
No infrastructure for social experiments currently exists; it would have to be developed. Testing 
fi  nancial products, like testing medications, would be extremely expensive. In pharmaceuticals, 
patent protection enables fi  rms to recoup R&D expenses, but a newly approved fi  nancial product 
could be off  ered by competing fi  rms. Th   ere would have to be careful consideration of how long 
a product must be tracked before it can be declared safe. Observing the whole 30-year term of a 
mortgage would not be feasible, but is one year—or fi  ve years—enough?
Post-market tracking is an area of signifi  cant overlap for Carpenter’s presentation and that 
of David Pittle. Carpenter explained that many important insights have been derived from the 
FDA’s database of incidents related to medications. Independent researchers have identifi  ed dan-
gerous properties of medications that became visible after the medication had been widely used. 
Dr. David Graham’s discovery of Vioxx’s adverse cardiovascular side eff  ects is one example (Gra-
ham et al. 2005)
David Pittle described how one of the fi  rst actions taken by the newly created Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission (CPSC) in 1973 was to establish a database of injuries and deaths related 
to consumer products. Th  e numbers collected were shocking: 30,000 deaths and over 2 mil-
lion injuries a year caused by common household products. Faced with this data, manufacturers 
could not dismiss reported problems as rare instances or anecdotes. Th   e Commission mandated 
design changes to address the most frequent problems. After-market monitoring is fragmented 
and mostly proprietary in the fi  nancial industry. Private companies maintain their own loan-
performance data or purchase it from private data aggregators. Bankruptcies and foreclosures are 
counted, but not tracked in detail nationally. Th   e Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data tracks 
loan applications and originations in moderate detail, but contains no performance informa-
tion. Th   is allows for the same problem Pittle found at the Commission’s beginning. Consumer 
advocates can identify cases of loan products causing harm, but regulators cannot distinguish an 
isolated problem from a systemic failure.
Pittle related guidelines that he has developed for thinking about consumer protection during 
his decades in the fi  eld. Several of these could be transferred to the fi  nancial product markets. 
Many dangers a product presents are impossible for consumers to assess. Th   ey cannot know how 
a car will protect them in an accident unless they crash the car. Th   ey cannot assess the fl  ammabil-
ity of a product without burning it. In fi  nancial products, the larger issue is probabilities and risk. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Consumers will not be aware of the likelihood of a fi  nancial problem associated with a product 
unless they have the fi  nancial expertise to locate data and analyze it, or to evaluate existing studies. 
Pittle believes that safety hazards become a type of transferred cost. If consumers were aware of 
a danger caused by a product, there would be lower demand and price for that product. Produc-
ers often avoid costs by not building in safety measures, but consumers bears a cost in the expect 
value of the damages the product may cause them. Government regulation forces producers to 
make a slightly more expensive product, but the unknown danger is removed. Th   e full cost is in 
the price, and the consumer can make an accurate cost–benefi  t decision. 
Speaking of consumer products, Pittle said, “It’s far more eff  ective to reduce injuries and 
deaths through the judicious use of safety standards on product performance than it is to teach 
consumers to adapt their behavior to the hazard.” Th   e problem with just informing consumers 
of risks, as he sees it, is that every consumer has to be educated before every contact with a new 
product. Th   is is an extremely expensive, never-ending task that will inevitably miss some people. 
In contrast, design changes that eliminate a hazard are permanent. Th   ey protect the unsophisti-
cated as well as the expert.
Ray Brescia, the third panelist, advocated for commodifying the relationship embodied in 
fi  nancial products. He defi  ned commodifi  cation as converting a relationship into something that 
can be sold. Financial products are currently dealt with in the courts through contract law, which 
treats both parties as partners, equal in all respects. In other areas of life, Brescia explained, we 
have recognized inequalities and developed the law accordingly. Employers and employees are 
recognized as unequal in terms of market power, so numerous protections for employees are built 
into labor laws. Collective bargaining, minimum wage laws, and child labor laws are examples. 
Th   e landlord–tenant relationship is also “embedded in a richer subtext,” according to Brescia. “It 
wasn’t 50 years ago that you could rent out a home and not be expected to provide heat and hot 
water to your tenants… and the tenant had to pay rent regardless of whether or not he or she 
received those services,” Brescia explained, “So in the landlord–tenant relationship we started to 
develop warranties, warranty of habitability being the big one.” By commodifying the borrower–
lender relationship, he believes, minimal consumer protections could be established.
Brescia also argued that mass tort action lawsuits should be fi  led when a fi  nancial product 
provider harms many consumers. Mass torts, he explains, have several advantages: Th   ey are ret-
rospective, so a regulator does not need to anticipate product innovations in order to address 
problems. Th   e discovery process uncovers qualitative information that would likely remain hid-
den, even with a post-market tracking system. If tort laws vary by state, experimentation by both 
plaintiff  s and defendants will occur, promoting novel solutions to problems. Th  e existence of 
mass torts encourages voluntary compliance. Firms may be in the best position to identify dan-POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 29, MAY 2010
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gerous products and keep them off   the market. Finally, settlements or damages provide relief to 
victims, which is not often the case under administrative regulators.
Consumer Protection Institutions
Unique among the day’s presenters, Pat McCoy focused primarily on the institutions and politics 
of consumer protection. She discussed the decisions that must be made regarding the regulator. 
Will it oversee all entities that extend credit, or only deposit-taking institutions? In the past, depos-
it-taking institutions were more heavily regulated because regulators were most concerned that de-
posits would be returned; in the last few years, however, millions of problematic loans were made 
by non-bank lenders. Th   e question of whether regulation should be done at the state or local level 
is also important. Th   ose in favor of federal regulation argue that it allows free competition across 
state lines, benefi  ting the consumer. Having rules that are consistent in all states keeps compliance 
costs lower. Th   ose favoring strict regulation fear that state-only regulation would lead to a race to 
the bottom, relaxing regulations to the point of irrelevance. Critics of federal regulation say that 
state experimentation will lead to better rules. Consumer advocates may be more likely to get eq-
uitable consideration in state legislatures than in Congress.
McCoy went on to discuss detailed regulations being written by Congress. Her argument 
against this practice is that fi  nancial providers will easily innovate to evade any binding restric-
tions written into the federal code. Th   e administrative rule-making process is better able to react 
to these changes and achieve protection objectives. As an example, she cited the Home Owner-
ship and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) triggers set by Congress, which were quickly evaded 
(Bostic et al. 2008). On the other hand, during economic expansions, business interests point to 
rules written by administrators and question the political legitimacy of the costs they add. Th  is 
can weaken support for the rules and undermine their ability to protect consumers.
McCoy spoke directly to the issue of an industry capturing its regulator. “OTS has many, 
many dedicated, wonderful employees,” she said, “but the leadership in recent years became cap-
tured.” Earlier, in the discussion following her own presentation, Pappalardo cited the breadth of 
the FTC’s mission as one of its strengths. “How do you set up an agency that is independent, and 
in a way that’s least likely to become captured by a particular interest group?” she asked. “…I’ll 
make a pitch for my agency. I think that because we regulate so many products, there isn’t focus 
on just one industry.” Because it protects customers in a wide variety of markets, she noted, the 
FTC has a broader constituency to support its independence and funding, whereas a focused 
agency can be neutralized if one producer lobby overwhelms one consumer lobby.
Presenter and Participant Discussion
In her comments as moderator, Creola Johnson raised the topic of consumer protection for minor-
ity and disadvantaged populations. “Th   e economic crisis has a disproportionate impact on com-
munities of color,” she said, “When the media talks about this they assume that all of the con-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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sumers out there are similarly situated and they’re not…” Johnson called conference participants’ 
attention to testimony by former employees of Washington Mutual, who charged that racially dis-
paraging remarks were used within the company to refer to populations targeted for marketing of 
subprime mortgages (Powell 2009). Quantitatively, it is clear that subprime and nontraditional 
loans had larger market shares in minority communities than elsewhere (Haughwout, Mayer, and 
Tracy 2009; Wachter, Russo, and Hershaff   2006). One study attempted to explain the observed 
higher annual percentage rates (APR) paid by minorities (Courchane 2009). Th   e APR gap is not 
signifi  cant in traditional mortgages, but it is large in nontraditional products. 
Regulation of mortgage lending already takes race and ethnicity into account to some degree. 
Th  e race and Hispanic origin of loan applicants and recipients is consistently tracked and re-
viewed through data gathered under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Th  e  HMDA 
data are a legacy of eff  orts to end systematic denial of credit to minorities. Dan Carpenter gave an 
example of the successful outcome of regulations with diff  erential treatment for minorities from 
the medical fi  eld, where equal treatment is not always optimal. Political interest groups pressured 
the FDA to focus more on women’s and minorities’ health issues, he explained. Th   e FDA began 
to require that clinical trials report results by demographic subgroup. Medical research discovered 
substantive diff  erences in treatment eff  ects for subgroups. Th   is informed the use or avoidance of 
treatments, and improved health outcomes overall. “Th   at’s a case where the politics in regulation 
actually improved the quality of the science that we have,” Carpenter said. 
A discussion led by Mark Sniderman closed out the conference with a review of several im-
portant points that were made during the presentation. Sniderman noted what seemed to be 
general agreement on the need to gather better data, either compiled by regulators or mandated 
for release from providers. David Pittle added that sometimes no coercive action is needed by 
regulators beyond the creation of measures. In the automobile market, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission began testing vehicles and releasing crash test safety ratings. Th   en car manu-
facturers began advertising high marks when they earned them and vigorously developing safer 
cars. Dan Carpenter came to the defense of disclosures, saying that they need not always be read 
by 100 percent of consumers; sometimes 20 percent to 40 percent of the consumers reading the 
disclosure, combined with word of mouth and media discussion, can make product characteris-
tics “common knowledge.”
A progressive use of post-marketing monitoring was discussed. For example, if a medication 
has been approved for prescription use and is used for several years with few safety issues, it can 
become an over-the-counter medication. Sniderman suggested that the fi  nancial products being 
referred to as “plain vanilla” may be treated like over-the-counter medications, not requiring an 
expert gatekeeper. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 29, MAY 2010
14
Conclusion
In the shadow of a major meltdown of the fi  nancial system, a historical view suggests that Con-
gress and the administration will be politically compelled to address the areas where it embroiled 
consumers. Regulation will be expanded to cover at least the problems evident in the recent crisis. 
Th   is is, after all, how the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and many other agencies came 
into existence. Th   ey addressed the problems of the past, which included loss of deposits and invest-
ments and lack of credit in residential housing markets. In contrast, today’s problems arose from 
an overabundance or underpricing of credit. 
With the demand for ordinary home mortgages satisfi  ed, fi  nancers had to fi  nd other margins 
on which to expand lending, such as lower down payments, home equity loans, and lower un-
derwriting standards, to qualify more borrowers. Consumers, who for decades were screened by 
lenders, were now encouraged to take on debt with minimal restraint. Th   is has harmed consum-
ers in a diff  erent but no less devastating way. Th   e new forms of consumer protection will seek to 
prevent consumers from becoming indebted beyond what they could conceivably repay and will 
seek to have the markets for consumer credit clear near a competitive price. 
A knee-jerk reaction could be to ban the exotic lending products that were involved in this 
latest bubble and to mandate that only “plain vanilla” credit products be sold. However, imple-
menting the recommendations suggested in the conference may make this unnecessary. 
Th   e emerging themes of the conference are informational. Th  e  fi  rst is data collection. Th  ere 
was general consensus that current tracking is not suffi   cient to identify problems so that action 
can be taken by any party—lenders, borrowers, regulators, or advocates—to correct these prob-
lems. A regulator should have suffi   cient data to identify products that are associated with dispro-
portionate levels of fi  nancial hardship for specifi  c types of borrowers.
Second, steps need to be taken to fi  x disclosures and ease comparison shopping. Intentionally 
or not, the complexity of current products was creating an information asymmetry, and some 
lenders exploited this to overcharge consumers. Designing simplifi  ed, standardized disclosures 
and testing them rigorously for eff  ectiveness can help to reduce this asymmetry. Also, consumers 
need to be able to choose among loans and lenders before they sink time and fees into a specifi  c 
choice. Th   is means shifting disclosures from complex forms received at the end of the shopping 
process to comparable numbers on key dimensions of loans that are easily accessible to all po-
tential borrowers. When these numbers are conveyed through claims, a regulator can assist con-
sumers by making sure the claims are factual and not misleading. Th   e possibility that a regulator 
could establish an exchange or nudging system that would help consumers fi  nd suitable products 
should be studied further, to determine if it is necessary and feasible.
From the legal perspective, two diff  erences in the law surrounding mortgage lending left this 
largest of consumer transactions open to misaligned incentives. A duty of care is currently im-
posed on agents in other consumer markets, including manufacturing and construction. Extend-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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ing the duty of care to all mortgage originators will make them liable for extreme mismatches 
of borrowers with loans. Coupled with assignee liability, this should motivate honest dealing. 
Brokers should help consumers fi  nd a reasonable loan for their fi  nancial situation. In essence, 
a new consumer protection regime would ask the gatekeepers of credit to walk a middle path, 
neither denying access when a loan can be benefi  cial to a consumer nor allowing consumers to 
take on unbearable debt. 
In the future, if the altered incentives and increased market competition are still insuffi   cient, 
the increased data collection will reveal if the credit markets are harming the consumer by deny-
ing or overextending access. If Congress or the regulator determines that some loan products do 
need to be banned, the extended data sources could enable an informed and targeted restriction. 
Th   e “Consumer Protection” conference provided a valuable overview for anyone who will be 
involved in fi  nancial product regulation in the future. Overall, consumer protection in other mar-
kets is much more developed and robust; it is based on a more realistic assessment of consumers’ 
behavior, resources, and role in the market. Regulation of fi  nancial product markets has been pri-
marily focused on ensuring equal access and requiring disclosure. In the future, regulators should 
arrange information fl  ows and align market participants’ incentives so that consumers stand a 
good chance of avoiding products that are dangerous to their fi  nancial health.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 29, MAY 2010
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